Abstract-Certificateless public key cryptography was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson to overcome the key escrow problem of ID-PKC. In this paper, we present an efficient certificateless signature scheme using bilinear maps. The scheme can be proved secure in the strongest security model of certificateless signature schemes. In terms of computational cost, totally, only two pairing operations are required for signing and verification. It is more efficient than the other existing certificateless signature schemes secure against a super type I/II adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION Identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) was first introduced by Shamir [13] in 1984. In their setting, the public key of a user is just his identity such as his telephone number or email address. This simplifies certificate management procedures of public key infrastructure (PKI) in traditional public key cryptography. However, ID-PKC suffers from the key escrow problem. That is a third party, the Private Key Generator (PKG) who is responsible for the generation of private keys for users, knows the private key of every user in the system. In order to overcome this drawback, Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] invented a new paradigm called certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC). CL-PKC also uses a third party called Key Generation Center (KGC) to help a user to generate his secret key. However, the KGC only provides a partial private key for each user. The full private key is generated by the user who makes use of the partial private key obtained from the KGC and the secret information chosen by himself. Hence, CL-PKC removes the key escrow problem. The public key of the user is computed from the KGC's public parameters and his secret information, and is published by the user himself.
Related Works: Several certificateless signature (CLS) schemes have been presented since its first try in [1] . Huang et al. [8] pointed out a security drawback of the primal CLS scheme in [1] and defined the security model of CLS schemes. Later, Zhang et al. [17] improved the security model of CLS schemes and presented a more efficient CLS scheme. In [15] , Yum and Lee presented a generic way to construct CLS schemes. However, Hu et al. [7] showed that their construction is insecure and presented a new construction. The security model of CLS schemes was further developed in [7] . Recently, Choi et al. [5] 1 , Yap el al. [14] presented some efficient CLS schemes whose securities were proved in the first security model of CLS schemes presented by Huang et al [8] . Unfortunately, Yap el al.'s scheme [14] is not secure and was broken [11] , [16] . The reason is that this model does not essentially capture the most powerful ability of the Type I adversary. Up to now, the security of most of the existing CLS schemes were proved using the random oracle model. A concrete CLS scheme secure in the standard model was proposed by Liu et al. [10] . A new kind of Type II attack-'Malicious but Passive KGC attack' is introduced in [2] . In the new attack, the KGC is assumed malicious at the very beginning of the Setup stage of the system.
Very recently, Huang et al. [9] revisited the security models of certificateless signature schemes. They further classified the Type I/II adversary into three types, namely the normal, strong and super Type I/II adversary. Their ability are from weak to strong. A normal adversary can only obtain some messagesignature pairs which are valid under the original public key from the target signer. While a strong adversary can obtain message-signature pairs which are valid under the replaced public key if he can supply the secret value corresponding to the replaced public key. And a super adversary can obtain some message-signature pairs which are valid under the public key chosen by himself without supplying the secret value corresponding to the public key. In [4] , [11] , [16] , they gave examples to show that a type I adversary can break a CLS scheme without knowing the secret value corresponding to the verification public key. So, to capture the most powerful ability of the adversary, we should consider it as a super type I/II adversary. Two new CLS schemes are also presented in [9] . The first one has a rather short signature length 2 with its security proved in a very weak model where the Type I adversary is a normal Type I adversary. The other one is very efficient. It requires only two pairing operations. Its security was proved in the strongest security model where the Type I/II adversary is a super adversary. But it has a long signature length. So far as we know, there are only a few CLS schemes [9] , [17] secure against a super type I/II adversary.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we present a very efficient CLS scheme, which requires only two pairing operations. The signature length of our new scheme is 2/3 of Huang et al.'s scheme [9] . As to the security aspect, our new CLS scheme is proved secure in the strongest security model of CLS schemes where the Type I/II adversary is a super Type I/II adversary. We complete our security proof using the random oracle model [3] assuming the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem over groups with bilinear maps.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. Bilinear Maps
Let G 1 be an additive group of prime order q and G 2 be a multiplicative group of the same order. An admissible map e : 
B. Framework of Certificateless Signature Schemes
A CLS scheme consists of six algorithms [9] . The description of each algorithm is as follows.
• Setup: This algorithm is run by the KGC that accepts as input a security parameter to generate a master-key and a list of system parameters params.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm is run by the KGC that accepts as input a user's identity ID, a parameter list params and a master-key to produce the user's partial private key D ID .
• Set-Secret-Value: This algorithm is run by a user that accepts as input a parameter list params and this user's identity ID to produce the user's secret value x ID . • Set-Public-Key: This algorithm is run by a user that takes as input a parameter list params, this user's identity ID and secret value x ID to produce the public key P ID for this user.
• Sign: This algorithm is run by a particular user that accepts a parameter list params, a message M ∈ M(M is the message space), the user's identity ID, public key P ID , partial private key D ID and secret value x ID to produce a signature σ on message M .
• Verify: This algorithm is run by a verifier that accepts a message M , a signature σ, a parameter list params, a signer's identity ID and corresponding public key P ID and to output true if the signature is valid, or ⊥ otherwise.
C. Adversarial Model of Certificateless Signature Schemes
There are two types of adversaries namely Type I adversary and Type II adversary with different capabilities in CL-PKC. A Type I adversary A I does not have access to the master-key, but he has the ability to replace the public key of any entity with a value of his choice. While a Type II Adversary A II has access to the master-key but cannot replace the target user's public key.
The security of a CLS scheme is modeled via the following two games between a challenger C and an adversary A I or A II . Game 1 (for Type I Adversary) Setup: C runs the Setup algorithm, takes as input a security parameter to obtain a master-key and the system parameter list params. C then sends params to the adversary A I while keeps the master-key secret. Attack: The adversary A I can perform a polynomially bounded number of the following types of queries in an adaptive manner.
• Partial-Private-Key Queries P P K(ID i ): A I can request the partial private key of any user with identity ID i . In response, C outputs the partial private key D i of the user.
• Public-Key Queries P K(ID i ): A I can request the public key of a user whose identity is ID i . In response, C outputs the public key for identity ID i .
• Secret-Value Queries SV (ID i ): A I can request the secret value of a user whose identity is ID i . In response, C outputs the secret value x i for identity ID i (It outputs ⊥, if the user's public key has been replaced).
For any user whose identity is ID i , A I can choose a new public key P i . A I then sets P i as the new public key of this user. C will record this replacement. Setup: C runs the Setup algorithm, takes as input a security parameter to obtain the system parameter list params and also the system's master-key. C then sends params and master-key to the adversary A II .
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the ICC 2008 proceedings.
Attack: The adversary A II can perform a polynomially bounded number of the following types of queries in an adaptive manner.
• 
III. OUR CERTIFICATELESS SIGNATURE SCHEME

A. An Efficient Construction
The construction of our efficient CLS scheme is as follows.
• Setup: Given a security parameter , the KGC chooses a cyclic additive group G 1 which is generated by P with prime order q, chooses a cyclic multiplicative group G 2 of the same order and a bilinear map e :
The KGC also chooses a random λ ∈ Z * q as the master-key and sets P T = λP , chooses cryptographic hash functions
* .
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm accepts params, master-key λ and a user's identity ID i ∈ {0, 1} * . It generates the partial private key for the user as follows.
1) Computes
Outputs the partial private key D i = λQ i .
• Set-Secret-Value: This algorithm takes as input params and a user's identity ID i . It then selects a random x i ∈ Z * q and outputs x i as the user's secret value.
• Set-Public-Key: This algorithm accepts params, a user's identity ID i and this user's secret value x i ∈ Z * q as input. It produces the user's public key P i = x i P .
• Sign: To sign a message M ∈ M using the partial private key D i and the secret value x i , the signer, whose identity is ID i and the corresponding public key is P i , performs the following steps.
• Verify: To verify a signature σ on a message M for an identity ID i and public key P i , the verifier performs the following steps. Using the technique describe in [1] , our scheme can easily achieve the trust level 3 [1] .
1) Compute
Q i = H 1 (ID i ||P ), u = H 2 (R||P i ||M ), v = H 3 (R||P i ||M ).
B. Comparison
We compare the efficiency of our scheme with that of the other two available CLS schemes secure against super type I and type II adversaries. The comparison is shown in Table 1 . Here we only consider the costly operations and we omit the computation efforts which can be pre-computed by the signer in the Sign phase. We denote by P a pairing operation, by S a scalar multiplication in G 1 , by H a MapToPoint hash operation and by E an exponentiation in G 2 . We use the notation SL meaning signature length, PKL meaning public key length, P 1 meaning the length of a point in G 1 and Z 1 meaning the length of a point in Z * q . The comparison shows that in the signing phase our CLS scheme requires only two scalar multiplication in G 1 . It is faster than the schemes in [9] , [17] . In the verification phase, our scheme also yields a computational advantage. It requires the least computational effort compared with the other two. In addition, the signature length of our scheme is about 2/3 of that of Huang et al.'s scheme [9] . And the public key of our scheme requires one point in G 1 , which is the same as that in the other two schemes [9] , [17] .
IV. SECURITY PROOF
Assuming that the CDH problem is hard, we now show the security of our CLS scheme.
Theorem 1: Our CLS scheme is unforgeable against a super type I adversary in the random oracle model assuming the CDH problem is intractable. Proof. Let C be a CDH attacker who receives a random instance (P, aP, bP ) of the CDH problem in G 1 and has to compute the value of abP . A I is a super type I adversary who interacts with C as modeled in Game 1. We show how C can use A I to solve the CDH problem, i.e. to compute abP . , α j , Q j ) . The same answer from the list H 1 will be given if the request has been asked before. On receiving a new query H 1 (ID i ||P ), C simulates the random oracle H 1 as follows.
to H 2 , the same answer from the list H 2 will be given if the request has been asked before. If the query
and returns u i as answer. H 3 Queries: C keeps an initially empty list H 3 of tuples (R j , P j , M j , v j ). Whenever A I issues a query (R i ||P i ||M i ) to H 3 , the same answer from the list H 3 will be given if the request has been asked before. For a new query
to H 3 and returns v i as answer. Partial-Private-Key Queries: C keeps an initially empty list K of tuples (ID j , x j , D j , P j ). When A I issues a query P P K(ID i ), the same answer from the list K will be given if the request has been asked before. If the query is new, C does the following. 
Public-Key Queries:
On receiving a query P K(ID i ), the current public key from the list K will be given if the request has been asked before. Otherwise, C does as follows.
1) If there's a tuple (ID i , x i , D i , P i ) on K (In this case, the public key P i of ID i has not been set), choose x i ∈ Z * q , compute P i = x i P , return P i as answer and update
On receiving a query SV (ID i ), if the public key of ID i has been replaced, C returns ⊥. Otherwise, if there's a tuple (ID i , x i , D i , P i ) on K, C returns x i as answer; else, C first makes P K(ID i ) then returns x i as answer. Public-Key-Replacement Queries: A I can choose a new public key for the user whose identity is ID i . On receiving a query
where P i denotes the public key chosen by A I , C generates the signature as follows. (Note A I need not supply the secret value which is used to generate 
. So C has successfully obtained the solution of the CDH problem.
Theorem 2: Our CLS scheme is unforgeable against a super type II adversary in the random oracle model assuming the CDH problem is intractable. Proof. Let C be a CDH attacker who receives a random instance (P, aP, bP ) of the CDH problem in G 1 and has to compute the value of abP . A II is a type II adversary who interacts with C as defined in Game 2. We show how C can use A II to solve the CDH problem, i.e. to compute abP .
C selects λ ∈ Z * q as the master-key, computes P T = λP , selects the system parameters params=(G 1 , G 2 Public-Key Queries: C keeps an initially empty list K of tuples (ID j , x j , P j ). On receiving a query P K(ID i ), the current public key from the list K of the user whose identity is ID i will be given if the request has been asked before. For a new query, if ID i = ID J , C returns P i = aP as answer and adds 
V. CONCLUSION
It is interesting and important to construct efficient CLS schemes secure against a super type I/II adversary. In this paper, we have put forward such an efficient CLS scheme. By our construction, only two pairing operations are required in signing and verification. It is more efficient than the other CLS schemes achieving the same security level. The security of our new scheme has been proved in the strongest security model for CLS schemes where the type I/II adversary is a super type I/II adversary.
